

*Dilshod B. Batirov**Associated professor of the Academy of the Republic of Uzbekistan***AMIR TEMUR'S CAMPAIGNS AGAINST TOKHTAMISH KHAN**

**Annotation:** This article describes the military art, management system and the supply of weapons of Amir Temur during the campaigns against Tokhtamish Khan.

**Keywords:** army, campaigns, main forces, combat, order front, light infantry, avanpost, guard, right wing (barangor), left wing (jarang'or), center (hand), aregard (chagdovul).

Amir Temur's leadership talent was clearly demonstrated during his campaigns against Tokhtamish Khan.

Campaigns of Amir Temur against Tokhtamysh Khan. Amir Temur was aware of the danger posed by the Golden Horde. He carefully followed the events happening in the village of Jochi. From 1360 to 1380, that is, in 20 years, 25 khans changed in the Golden Horde. In 1375, Orish Khan, the ruler of the White Horde, decided to unite two parts of the Jochi ulus – the Golden Horde and the White Horde. The hordes could unite and pose a serious threat to Amir Temur's state. Amir Temur skillfully used the situation to prevent this danger.

Toi Khoja, one of the Uzbek emirs of the White Horde, was killed by Uriskhan for refusing to participate in the military campaign against the Golden Horde. Tokhtamish oglun, the son of Toi Khoja oglun, escaped from the White Horde and came to Samarkand in 1376.

Amir Temur decided to use it to fight Oris Khan. Amir Temur thought that Tokhtamysh would be the one who would carry out his policy in Jochi ulus. But it turned out to be the opposite. With the help of Amir Temur, Tokhtamysh, who became the Khan of the White Horde, followed in the footsteps of Orishkhan, that is, he began to fight for the unification of the Jochi clan and the creation of the mighty Golden Horde. Tokhtamysh, who became the ruler of the White Horde (1377), decided to take advantage of the defeat of his rival and false khan Mamaikhan against the Russian prince Dmitry Donskoy in the field of Kulikovo, and in the same year crushed the remaining army of Mamaikhan on the banks of the Kalka river. After this victory, Tokhtamysh became the supreme ruler of the Golden Horde and began to unite both parts of the Jochi ulus.

The disagreements between Amir Temur and the ambitious and scheming Tokhtamysh took the form of an open fight.

On June 18, 1391, a battle took place between Amir Temur and Tokhtamish's army on the banks of the Kunduzcha River (present-day Samara region in Russia). About 400,000 warriors from both sides participated in this battle, and this battle was one of the largest battles of that time.

The battle order of Amir Temur's army in this battle is fully reflected in the works of Nizamuddin Shami and Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi. It was compiled by the owner himself. Amir Temur was the first to establish a combat order using the method of "seven arms", that is, corps, which until then had not been used by anyone. Ali Yazdi writes about this: "The ruler himself lined up the army in the order of seven hands. Until now, I have not heard of any king marshaling his army like this". Also, according to his information, Ghanim's army was more than Amir Temur's army by several koshuns (a military unit of 500 men). [1]

Amir Temur's army was based on nomadic tribes, which supplied cavalry and archers. The settled people trained the army for infantry and auxiliary farms, workers for siege of cities and towns, soldiers who used catapults, hammers, burning arrows and flaming grenades made of oil mixture.

The soldiers in Amir Temur's army were paid regular salaries. The size of the salary depends on how the service is performed. A common soldier received a salary equal to the value of 2 to 4 horses,

a tenth – the same as the salary of his tenth (therefore he was interested in his warriors getting a higher salary), a hundred was paid a salary equal to the salary of six tens, and so on. One of the types of disciplinary punishments was the withholding of one-tenth of the salary.

There were also light infantrymen in the army, who traveled on horseback during the journey, and fought on foot like the Arabs, dismounting from their horses in order to hit the target with a bow. The infantryman is armed with a sword and a bow with 30 arrows. Light infantry was used for movement on high ground and siege of cities. In addition, Amir Temur organized a special detachment (mountain infantry) for movement in the mountains.

The order of battle of Amir Temur's army was as follows. Amir Suleimanshah commanded the hand lined up in the center. This group was followed by the second group led by Mirza Muhammad Sultan. Mirza Mironshah's hand was lined up in Barangor, Khoja Sayfiddin's hand was lined up on the right wing, playing the role of Kunbul. Javangor was formed from the army of Mirza Umarshaikh. As Kunbul - the hand of Berdibek Saribug was placed on the left wing. The center of the army's battle order was blocked by the vanguard (manglai). Behind the front of the hand, there was a hailstorm with the rank of Supreme Commander-in-Chief Amir Temur. A 20,000-strong army under the command of Amir Temur was allocated to the reserve. These reserve forces were decisive for the outcome of the battle.

On the opposite side, Khan Tokhtamysh divided his army into five divisions, which were commanded by prominent generals and the emirs of Dashti Kipchak. Before the battle, Amir Temur used a mental attack. In order to influence the enemy and instill hatred in his army, he ordered his grandson Mirza Abubakr's detachment to build tents and cook food in pots. All this stunned the enemy so much that he froze in place.

Amir Temur, having destroyed the enemy and obtained a large booty, returned to Samarkand with his army (at the end of October 1391).

The main results and lessons of this military campaign and battle are:

Amir Temur's army carried out the planned campaign in difficult and difficult conditions, in which the route traveled through the desert areas alone exceeded 2,500 kilometers;

Amir Temur's army passed through difficult and difficult sections of the journey without the enemy noticing;

with his skillful maneuvers, Amir Temur cut off Tokhtamish's army from the south side, where additional support forces could arrive from the Azov region;

with his skillful actions, Sahibkiran forced Tokhtamish to engage in a major battle, thus depriving him of the opportunity to wage small wars that would exhaust his army, which had made a difficult journey;

during the trip, Amir Temur's army crossed large and small water barriers. Shallow crossings (fords), bridges and the method of sailing were used;

in the Battle of Kunduzcha, Amir Temur was the first to use a new battle order of dividing his army into seven parts. A powerful backup was also allocated;

before the battle, Sahibkiran conducted a mental attack aimed at damaging the enemy's mental state;

the result of the battle was decided by the inclusion of the reserve and Amir Temur's powerful strike from the wing;

the pursuit of the enemy was carried on with such intensity that he was scattered or routed before he could regroup. [2]

According to Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi, established travel order (murchil), every ten begi, yuzbegi, thousandbegi and tumanbegi (commander of an army of 10 thousand) according to their position and

rank, strictly observing discipline moved. Those who violated the order were severely punished, they were even given the death penalty.

When they stopped to rest, the army was usually surrounded by carts connected by chains and ropes. Trenches have been dug and fences have been erected in front of them. With the appearance of Ghanim's army, the fighters left their positions and spread out in battle formation and moved against the enemy.

Amir Temur's army moved in the following order during the journey: far ahead of the main forces, carts loaded with necessary things moved behind them. In one of the main places there is a place to cross the water. The crossing is guarded by guard posts. The army crossed the river in parts and units. During the march, the warriors used boats, nets or built pontoon bridges.

In the army of Amir Temur, during the distribution of booty, anyone who acted arbitrarily, even if he was a close relative of Sahibkiran, was severely punished. All his property was confiscated and he was executed. Only after permission was granted, each participant of the campaign, regardless of his class and rank, had the right to receive an equally distributed part of the booty. [3]

Although the army formed by Amir Temur was close to the system of Genghis Khan's army in terms of its organizational staff system, it was distinguished by the following characteristics:

1. Although Amir Temur's army was considered a people's army, it did not have a general character, as it was during the time of Genghis Khan.

2. During the time of Genghis Khan, the base of the army was made up of nomads. During the time of Amir Temur, the settlers provided horsemen and archers. But at the same time, the settled population also made up a large part of the army. Thus, farmers, artisans and other categories of the settled population were called up for military service along with herdsmen due to the increased frequency and scale of wars.

3. In the army of Amir Temur, together with cavalry, which formed the basis of the army, infantry also played a major role. During the time of Genghis Khan, there were no full-fledged infantry.

4. Amir Temur was one of the first in the East to introduce artillery weapons (ra'd) to his army. The introduction of a new type of small arms made it possible to create artillery units, and as a result, the number of gunners (radandoz) reached several thousand people. Artillery weapons are designed to destroy the enemy's manpower and equipment and to besiege fortresses and citadels. They are installed in very important sections of the siege line.

5. Special infantry troops were organized to move skillfully in mountainous areas.

6. Amir Temur skillfully arranged the battle order and maneuvered them with agility, made unexpected attacks with cavalry on the enemy's flanks and behind the front line, depending on the situation, divided his army into nine and seven parts (arms).

7. Women's units were introduced into the army, and they stood alongside men in battle and set examples of glory and bravery.

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